The natural emergence of (bio)semiosic phenomena by van Hateren, J. H.
  
 University of Groningen
The natural emergence of (bio)semiosic phenomena





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2015
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
van Hateren, J. H. (2015). The natural emergence of (bio)semiosic phenomena. Biosemiotics, 8(3), 403-
419. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-015-9241-4
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Natural Emergence of (Bio)Semiosic Phenomena
J. H. van Hateren1
Received: 28 October 2014 /Accepted: 30 April 2015 /Published online: 27 May 2015
# The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Biological organisms appear to have agency, goals, and meaningful behav-
iour. One possibility is that this is mere appearance, where such properties are not real,
but only ‘as if’ consequences of the physiological structure of organisms. Another
possibility is that these properties are real, as emerging from the organism's structure
and from how the organism interacts with its environment. Here I will discuss a recent
theory showing that the latter position is most likely correct, and argue that the theory is
largely consistent with the basics of the field of biosemiotics. The theory can be
represented as a triad that resembles the semiotic triad proposed by Peirce, which
connects a sign with its object through a process of interpretation. In the theory
presented, the sign is an internalized version of fitness (i.e., expected reproductive rate)
which refers to the true fitness through a feedback loop that in effect produces
interpretation. The feedback loop entangles deterministic and stochastic forms of
causation in such a way that genuine agency, goal-directedness, and their associated
meaning emerge. It produces a strong form of emergence not reducible to its constit-
uents. The result is that novel phenomena arise that are real and necessary components
for a complete understanding of living organisms.
Keywords Agency .Meaning . Emergence . Semiotics . Peirce . Causation
Introduction
A biological organism may be seen as a purely material system driven by environmen-
tal factors and by the organism's genetic and physiological structure. But it may also be
seen as an individual with agency and goals. A basic question that has been haunting
biological thinking for a long time is whether the second view is a mere consequence of
the first view, or whether it adds something extra. The ‘mere consequence’ idea implies
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that it is enough to study an organism's structure and physiology in as much detail as
possible. Such a detailed analysis will then eventually show that agency and goals are not
real but only apparent, in an ‘as if’ kind of way. On the other hand, the ‘adds something
extra’ idea seems to require ingredients that have no counterpart in the non-living material
world. Introducing such ingredients on an ad hoc basis is an unattractive proposition.
Away out for the ‘adds something extra’ view may be the concept of emergence, the
idea that new properties may arise from specific configurations of matter. For example,
certain spherical objects with sufficient hardness obtain the property that they can roll
on a plain, and the property of rollability may then be seen as emergent. However, that
would be a property that is fully predictable once the properties of the material and the
configuration are specified, and rollability is not radically different from other mechan-
ical properties that are known to exist. The problem with agency and goals is that they
do seem to be radically different from anything else in nature. If agency and goals are
really emergent, it needs to be shown in which specific way they can emerge and why it
is plausible that they arise in the radically new form they do.
In this article, I discuss a theory (van Hateren 2015) that can indeed let agency and
goals emerge from components that lack those properties. I specifically put this theory
within the context of the field of biosemiotics, which addresses similar issues, and show
that it matches quite well with the main ideas of that field. Moreover, I argue that the
emerging properties are fundamentally new and cannot be reduced to (or replaced by) a
description of components and their configuration.
The article is organized as follows. The theory presented depends on Darwinian
mechanisms, including modern additions as in an extended synthesis (see e.g., Pigliucci
and Müller 2010), but also the crucial extension presented here. I therefore start with a
short perspective on the Darwinian approach (Section The Darwinian Approach) to
avoid possible misunderstandings. Subsequently, the theory is explained in
Section Origination Agency and Meaning, and it is connected with biosemiotics in
Section Interpretation in Terms of Biosemiotics. In Section On Explanation, Reduction,
and the Various Forms of Causation, the issues of reduction and emergence are
discussed, and finally, Section Conclusion summarizes the main points of the article.
The Darwinian Approach
The approach taken here is closely associated with the original Darwinian vision of
understanding evolution as a result of the differential reproductive success of organisms
that depends on their phenotype.1 This vision has often been perceived as implying a
materialistic, gene-centred, and deterministic view of life, which excludes genuine agency
andmeaning.2 I will argue below that such an implication is unwarranted, because a slight
but far-reaching extension of the basic Darwinian theory can include agency andmeaning.
However, it is important to clarify from the beginning how my approach is related to
other modern extensions of the evolutionary theory. Modern extensions include
1 A phenotype is the actual form (its total of characteristics) through which an organism interacts with the
world.
2 Throughout this article, the term ‘meaning’ is used in a general sense as in ‘the meaning of an action’, rather
than in the more specific sense as in ‘the meaning of a word’.
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interactions between development and evolution, phenotypic plasticity, niche construc-
tion, gene-culture coevolution, and a range of sophisticated hereditary mechanisms
such as epigenetics and other forms of enhanced evolvability (Laland et al. 2011) and
adaptability (Sharov 2014). These factors are considered within the so-called extended
evolutionary synthesis (Pigliucci and Müller 2010). Much of this extension is data
driven, as more complex evolutionary mechanisms are gradually uncovered. But it is
also driven by an implicit concern that the conventional evolutionary view stresses
genetic causes too much, to the detriment of other causes that originate from
development and behaviour. This apparently motivated Laland et al. (2014) to call it
Ba struggle for the very soul of the discipline^.
Unfortunately, to the extent that it is an attempt to advocate agency as arising from
the organism it appears to be misfiring. Elsewhere (van Hateren 2014a) I argue that
causes that seem to originate from the organism do not produce agency if they are
merely a result of complex causal loops that are primarily deterministic – with any
stochasticity (i.e., randomness) regarded as noise. None of the cogwheels in a clock-
work can be a source of agency and meaning, nor can any combination of cogwheels,
no matter how complex. The problem with regard to agency is not the apparent origin
of causes, but the assumption of determinism. The new, modern mechanisms of
evolutionary change can therefore only contribute to agency if they include
stochasticity in their causal scheme in a highly specific way (van Hateren 2014a).
Below I will focus on the simplest evolutionary mechanism for the emergence of
agency, the one that is easiest to understand. However, this does not imply that other
processes could not be involved if they similarly entangle deterministic and stochastic
forms of causation. I also do not intend to imply that the Darwinian mechanism is the
only one producing evolution. But I do claim that the Darwinian mechanism with its
extension as explained below is the only one known that is capable of generating
agency and meaning. More complex forms of agency and meaning all derive from and
depend on this origin.
Originating Agency and Meaning
Before explaining the process that can generate agency and meaning, I will first make a
few general remarks about causation in nature. I use the term ‘causation’ in a very
general sense, as referring to any relationship between a cause and its effect (both taken
here as changes in time). Thus it includes physical,3 mental, and possibly other forms of
causation. Note that ‘causation’ is best seen as an idealization (i.e., a mental construct)
useful for understanding reality (see also van Hateren 2014b, section 3.3), but it is at the
same time taken here to correspond, at least approximately, to actual phenomena in the
real world.
There are two main forms of causation in physical nature. The first, deterministic
causation, is illustrated in Fig. 1a. The graph shows the change of a variable, such as a
state or some property of a system. This change is caused by other variables (left
3 The term ‘physical’ as used in this article refers to anything conventionally studied by the natural sciences, in
particular non-living matter, but also the material aspects of life. It excludes mind, primarily mental processes,
agency, value, and meaning.
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arrow), and it subsequently causes changes in downstream variables either in the same
system or in other systems (right arrow). Causes can be multiple and complex, but the
crucial property of a deterministic system is that the change of state remains fully
predictable, just like the motions of cogwheels in a clock. In practice, ‘deterministic’
should be interpreted as ‘almost deterministic’ or ‘primarily deterministic’, because real
systems always display some noise.
The second main form of causation is stochastic, as illustrated in Fig. 1b. A
stochastic process produces changes over time that are not caused by upstream factors
but arise spontaneously. This change may then become a starting point of novel
downstream causal chains (arrow). Stochastic causation may originate from thermal
or quantum noise, from untraceable external disturbances of a system, and from
unstable dynamics that amplifies microscopic uncertainties (as in chaos). Stochastic
causation implies unpredictability. Stochasticity is ubiquitous in nature in general and
in living organisms in particular, from the molecular to the behavioural level (Faisal
et al. 2008; Kiviet et al. 2014).
Avery specific combination of deterministic and stochastic causation is illustrated in
Fig. 1c. It is called ‘modulated stochastic causation’, and is assumed here to play a
major role in generating agency and meaning. In this form of causation, one variable
(left curve) is caused deterministically by upstream factors (arrow 1). This variable
subsequently modulates the variance of a second, stochastic variable (right curve).
Finally, the stochastic variable causes changes in downstream factors (arrow 3). For the
purpose of presentation, the deterministic variable is shown as changing slowly and the
stochastic variable as changing fast, but this is not a necessary property. This type of
causation still occurs when the two variables have similar temporal properties, even if it
would then be difficult to visualize in a simple graph. Modulated stochastic causation is























Fig. 1 Origin of agency and intrinsic meaning. a In deterministic causation, a time-varying variable
(representing a system state or property) is caused by (left arrow) and causes (right arrow) other variables.
b In stochastic causation, a random variable can start new chains of causation (arrow). c In modulated
stochastic causation, a non-negative deterministic variable (left curve) drives the variance of a stochastic
variable (right curve). d Behaviour of an organism ultimately depends on Darwinian fitness ftrue, which is
assumed to be approximated by an internal estimate fest, made implicitly by the organism itself. It drives the
variable component of behaviour that cannot be chosen based on previous learning. The mechanism is
evolvable when low fest produces large variability and high fest small variability (symbolized by ~1/ fest).
The reproductive loop R contributes to the population, which is part of an environment that affects the
organism's fitness (arrow p). The active feedback loop A uses modulate stochastic causation (arrows 1–3 as in
c) to gradually produce agency, and intrinsic meaning as embodied in the form of fest. Agency and meaning
depend on feedback through the organism's environment (arrow s)
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unpredictable (because the variance of the stochastic variable changes in a deterministic
way). Although it can occur in non-living nature, it is in its pure form rather special and
therefore likely to be unstable and ephemeral. As will be shown below, it can be
stabilized by evolution when it is part of a highly specific and evolvable feedback loop.
Figure 1d explains how modulated stochastic causation can play a crucial role in
generating agency and meaning. The left part of the figure represents the basic
Darwinian theory of evolution. It consists of a reproductive loop R, where organisms
reproduce with a rate that corresponds to their fitness (called ftrue below). As a first-
order approximation, this rate is defined here as expected number of offspring per unit
of time. It is a probabilistic variable that indicates, at each moment in time, how likely it
is that an organism will reproduce. Note that it is not identical to the actual number of
offspring that an organism gets, which is a stochastic realization of the reproduction rate
accumulated over the lifetime of an organism. The fitness indicates, from moment to
moment (i.e., instantaneously), how well the organism is doing from the point of view
of expected reproduction. It can decrease or increase depending on the circumstances,
such as availability of food and mates, or the likelihood or occurrence of a disease. It
finally drops to zero when the organism dies. It is important to stress that fitness as used
here (both ftrue and its estimate, fest, as discussed below) are not just simple parameters,
but more akin to mathematical functions, which have not only a value but also a form
and argument(s). Fitness is in fact a complex dynamical process, with an intricate form
(structure) involving many inputs and a single output. The many inputs arise from the
environment and internal factors, including the organism's hereditary and behavioural
memory. The single output is the expected rate of reproduction. Both the process and its
outcome (the rate) are denoted here by ftrue (or by fest). The intended meaning is usually
clear from the context, but in cases of possible misunderstanding I will refer to the
value or form of ftrue (or fest).
Fitness depends on both the organism's properties and the environment, including
other organisms. The environment is assumed to vary unpredictably, or at least partly
unpredictably, over a wide range of timescales, that is, over evolutionary time as well as
within the lifetime of individual organisms. When organisms reproduce, they will
produce offspring that is similar, but not identical to themselves. Organisms with
fitness exceeding the level required for replacement will increase in numbers exponen-
tially (if the fitness remains high). Their offspring is likely to thrive as well, because
environments typically change slowly. But they do change nonetheless, and occasion-
ally quite fast. The variability of offspring properties then implies that some offspring
will do better than others. The offspring with higher fitness will reproduce faster, on
average. As a result of these differences in reproduction rate, the properties of organ-
isms as distributed over the population will change (i.e., evolve). The environment
includes the population and its properties, such as total size and distribution over
different types. The R loop determines how these properties change over time, which
is symbolized in Fig. 1d by the arrow from R loop to environment. The population size
subsequently affects the reproduction of organisms (as indicated by arrow p, which also
represents other environmental influences), and thereby their fitness ftrue.
The basic Darwinian theory as explained above depends only on deterministic and
stochastic causation (or simple combinations), and cannot produce goals and meaning.
However, an extension of the basic mechanism is possible that produces such new,
emergent phenomena. This extended Darwinian mechanism can be formulated either
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on the timescale of evolution or on the timescale of the lifetime of individual organ-
isms. The former approach is relevant for changes along lines of descent of organisms
(van Hateren 2014a, 2015), whereas the latter is relevant for ontogenetic changes and
learning (van Hateren 2014b, 2015). I will focus here on the latter case, where such
changes are all summarized by the term ‘behaviour’. Behaviour is interpreted broadly
here, including physiological changes within unicellular organisms and phenotypic
plasticity.
The right half of Fig. 1d illustrates the main idea of the extended theory. In addition
to the true, external fitness ftrue there is also a subject-generated
4 version of fitness,
generated by the organism itself and present in its physiology as an intrinsic process.
Like ftrue, it is supposed to change over time, and its value is assumed to produce a
reasonable approximation of the value of ftrue. It is analogous to what one would denote
by the term ‘estimate’ in the context of estimation theory. It is therefore called
‘(self-)estimated fitness’, fest (van Hateren 2013, 2014a, b, 2015). It should be stressed
that the term ‘estimate’ should not be interpreted in terms of human intentions. It is used
here to denote the outcome (i.e., the value of fest) of an internal process (the form of fest,
that is, its physiological realization) that approximates the outcome (the value of ftrue) of
another process (the form of ftrue, that is, the way in which various factors affect ftrue).
The estimated fitness fest does not assume explicit statistical knowledge on the part of
the organism, because it can just evolve through regular, undirected evolutionary
mechanisms like any other physiological process within organisms (such as colour
vision, which does not assume explicit knowledge about electromagnetism). Also, note
that fest should not be confused with the empirical estimate by an evolutionary biologist
based on counting offspring. The estimated fest refers here to a real process in an
organism, independently of whether scientists exist or not.
The self-estimated fitness affects changes in behaviour in the following way. When
fest is above the replacement level (the level balancing reproducing and dying), the
organism is probably doing well, because fest is assumed to reflect ftrue. Thus, there is
little reason to change behaviour, apart from small changes that may keep options for
finding even better behaviour. But when fest is below the replacement level, the
organism is not doing well and may fail to reproduce or even die. The behaviour
should therefore be changed to avoid these outcomes. One possibility is that an
organism performs a behaviour that is known (i.e., expected) to work well in given
circumstances. Such knowledge may be embodied in genomic memory formed in
earlier evolution or in physiological and neural memory formed by previous learning.
Such memories were formed when similar circumstances occurred and successful
behaviours were found. However, behaviour based on such embodied memories can
be performed automatically (i.e., deterministically). It therefore does not directly
involve agency, although indirectly it may have been produced by agency originally.5
But environmental changes are partly unpredictable, and the consequences of behav-
ioural change are therefore partly unpredictable as well. For this unpredictable part,
4 I deliberately use ‘subject-generated’ rather than ‘subjective’ here, because the meaning of the latter is often
associated with consciousness and idiosyncrasy, whereas the subject-generated fitness is constrained by the
requirement that it conforms reasonably well to ftrue, which is an objective variable.
5 Original agency does not imply current agency. As a crude analogue, appliances such as autopilots and
robotic lawn mowers exist and work because of the agency and goals of their builders and users, and in a sense
they empower their users’ agency and goals. But they are not a source of agency and goals themselves.
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there is no rule for changing the behaviour. In other words, the change must be random.
However, the expected magnitude of the random change (i.e., its variance) should then
depend on fest, because when fest is low, then large changes are needed. Large changes
in behaviour may initially be disadvantageous especially if the direction of change
proves to be wrong. But large changes also increase the probability of finding a
behaviour with high fest. When that happens, the behavioural variability is automati-
cally reduced, because high fest implies making subsequent variability small (the A loop
cycles continually). The subsequent behaviour will then remain in the vicinity of this
beneficial behaviour, drifting away only slowly. Simulations show that this way of
changing behaviours (small variability when fest is large and large variability when fest
is small) is evolvable (van Hateren 2015). In particular, populations that incorporate
this mechanism outcompete populations with a fixed variability of behaviour. The very
strong drive provided by fitness is the primary reason why this mechanism is effective:
fitness above the replacement level leads to a fast, exponential growth in numbers. It
thereby can compensate, on average, for the losses that are produced by large undi-
rected changes and by the time it takes to find behaviours with high fest.
The inverse relationship between fest and behavioural variability is symbolized by
~1/fest in Fig. 1d, but the exact form is itself an evolvable property of organisms and
may be somewhat different. An assumption of the model is that the value of fest has
evolved to be sufficiently close to the value of ftrue such that the mechanism would
work effectively. That is not a trivial matter (see van Hateren 2015 for a discussion),
because ftrue is highly complex. It depends not only on the properties of an organism
itself, but also on the unpredictable time-varying environment and on other organisms
that are evolving as well. Nevertheless, a perfect match between fest and ftrue is not
necessary for the mechanism to be advantageous (van Hateren 2015), and the assump-
tion is that even fairly rough versions of fest can work well enough.
As an example of how fest might approximate the value of ftrue, consider a bacterium.
Its ftrue depends on a range of external and internal factors, for example the presence of
nutrients or toxins, temperature, being prey to amoebae, and internal factors important
for maintaining homeostasis. Complex interactions of such factors affect the rate of
bacterial reproduction. Some of these factors may be sensed by a bacterium and may be
subsequently used, through internal physiological processes, to construct an implicit
internal representation and approximation of fitness, fest. For example, if the bacterium
senses a lack of nutrients, this may lower the value of fest. Similarly, when the bacterium
is attacked by amoebae, it may adjust its fest by using indicators that are expected to
correlate with such an attack. It is important to stress that the value of fest is very
unlikely to be explicitly represented in the form of a single physiological variable.
Rather, it suffices to be present only implicitly, as a distributed and diffuse process
operating throughout the physiology of the bacterium. Thus both the form and the value
of fest are taken to be distributed entities, but nevertheless as real as they come.
Although fitness (both ftrue and fest) has a single value (a reproduction rate),
transforming the single value of fest into structural changes of behaviour is far from
being simple for real organisms. Each organism has many ways to change its behav-
iour, but using them all equally (i.e., with equal variance) would not be a good strategy.
Instead, behaviours that are associated directly with input factors that strongly deter-
mine fest should change more than other behaviours. In other words, the partial fitness
effects of each input and each behavioural output must be taken into account and be
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properly weighted. For complex fest and complex behavioural possibilities, this will
quickly become intractable if one tries to model it explicitly. But it is plausible that a
proper association of input and output factors with fest can readily evolve through
standard evolutionary mechanisms. The implication is that both the process constituting
fest from its inputs and the process transforming fest into a range of behavioural changes
are of a distributed nature.
The mechanism of Fig. 1d involves modulated stochastic causation (arrows 1–3
correspond to those in Fig. 1c) operating in a feedback loop (i.e., a loop with cyclical
causation,6 loop A in Fig. 1d). The A loop produces goals and agency, as will be argued
now. The form of fest is defined by which environmental and internal variables an
organism uses as predictors of fest, and in which way it uses them. The form determines
which areas of behavioural space (i.e., the possible behavioural repertoire) are associated
with low behavioural variability and which areas with high variability. This association
is already sufficient, purely for statistical reasons, to drive the behaviour towards the
areas with low variability. The word ‘towards’ should not be interpreted too literally
here, because the behaviour is not changed into a specific direction – all behavioural
changes are random, apart from their variance. But probabilistically, behaviour will
diffuse away from areas with high variability more quickly than from areas with low
variability, and thus it will tend to stay in areas with low variability. Therefore, it appears
to be driven towards such areas. Because low variability is associated with high fest, high
fest must then be seen as a genuine goal of an organism. Note that this reasoning does not
depend on what exactly fest represents. It could represent an arbitrary goal (see Fig. 1b in
van Hateren 2015 as an example). But arbitrary goals would not be evolvable through
the basic Darwinian mechanism, because they do not specifically promote fitness and
probably even reduce fitness, as striving for goals generally carries costs. In other words,
the only goal that is evolvable and stable in the long run is fitness itself, ftrue.
Consequently, fest must be an approximation of ftrue, because otherwise the mechanism
would not have evolved. There is no guarantee that fest will remain an approximation of
ftrue when circumstances change, but a mismatch would lead to a disadvantage relative to
other organisms with a better form of fest. Thus a persistent mismatch would presumably
lead to extinction, and would have done so in the past. It is therefore likely that fest has
evolved to become fairly robust against common disturbances.
Although striving for high fest is the overall goal of an organism, in practice this goal
will consist of a large number of sub-goals. Such sub-goals can be seen as resulting
from a partitioning of the form of fest, that is, a partitioning of the process constituting
fest into sub-processes. Together, these sub-processes, and the sub-goals they represent,
serve the general goal of high fest. Partitioning of fest into effective and coherent sub-
processes is likely to facilitate improving the form of fest, through evolution or learning,
and is therefore likely to be evolvable.
Apart from establishing fest as a genuine goal, the A loop also produces agency,
because the causation that results from the feedback loop is rather special. The
modulated stochastic causation already intermingles deterministic and stochastic factors
(fest and the behavioural variability, respectively), but the loop strongly amplifies this
effect. Each time the loop is traversed (which happens continually), fest and the
6 The term ‘feedback’ is used here in the general sense of any cyclic or mutual causation, thus not limited to
stabilizing (negative) feedback.
410 J.H. van Hateren
stochasticity become further entangled. First, the value of fest determines the behav-
ioural variability and the stochastic outcome determines a new behaviour; then, the new
behaviour leads to a new value of ftrue and therefore a new value of fest. In the next pass
through the A loop, the new value of fest again determines behavioural variability, and
so on and so forth. Eventually, there is no way to separate causation into deterministic
and stochastic components. The details of the behavioural trajectory are unpredictable
because of the stochasticity, but the overall direction of the trajectory depends on the
goal, namely high fest. The behaviour therefore combines a certain spontaneity (in the
form of stochasticity) with a certain deliberateness (in the form of striving for high fest).
Such a combination is the signature of agency, at least an elementary form of agency
(elsewhere I call it ‘active causation’, van Hateren 2015). The behavioural trajectory is
driven by an internal goal (high fest), but the trajectory is not fully determined, for two
reasons. First, because of the stochasticity in the A loop, as discussed above. Second,
the form of fest is not fixed, neither in evolution nor within the lifetime of an individual
organism. This is because there are many different forms of fest that are approximately
equivalent in terms of how closely they can approximate the value of ftrue. Such
different forms and their improvements are evolvable and learnable as well. They
may be accessible through hereditary and behavioural variability, but also more
deliberately through a dialogue between or within organisms (van Hateren 2014b).
By internalizing the external ftrue as fest via the A loop, the organism obtains a
genuine goal and genuine agency. Having a goal and agency implies that the goal is
important to the organism and thereby assigns value to the goal. In other words, the
behaviour becomes meaningful. Because this meaning is generated within the organ-
ism, I have elsewhere coined the term ‘intrinsic meaning’ for it (van Hateren 2015).
The emergence of meaning suggests that the current theory can be interpreted in terms
of semiotics (see Interpretation in Terms of Biosemiotics).
Interpretation in Terms of Biosemiotics
The Semiotic Triad
Biosemiotics involves the study of meaning in biological systems, and amongst its
intellectual roots is semiotics. One of the most popular systems for describing signs and
their meaning is the triadic one promoted by Peirce (2010). This system is often used
for analysing meaning in a linguistic context (e.g., Chandler 2007), but it can also be
applied to meaning in biology (e.g., Hoffmeyer 2012). My purpose here is to show that
the meaning-generating theory described above can be represented as a triad. Although
this suggests a resemblance to the Peircian triad, it is left to future analysis to establish
how deep that resemblance goes.
Figure 2a shows how the basic Peircian triad can represent signification, the overall
process of producing meaning. It consists of three elements that become mutually
related, as symbolized by the lines joined in the centre. The sign (or sign vehicle) is
called representamen by Peirce, because it represents. It is connected to an object (the
semiotic object to which the sign vehicle refers) by the interpretant. The interpretant
produces the interpretation of the sign and thereby, more generally, the meaning of the
overall process. A typical example of a sign is smoke that is connected to its object, fire,
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through an interpretant that consists of the idea that smoke usually indicates fire. Smoke
is then a sign of fire.
Figure 2b shows how the mechanism of Fig. 1d can be tentatively interpreted as a
(primordial) semiotic triad. The subject-generated fest refers to the external ftrue through
the meaning-generating A loop. The A loop implicitly interprets fest, and by doing so
enhances the organism's fitness. This loop is the primary source of meaning, and
because of the dynamical and stochastic nature of the mechanism, it generates agency
as well. The organism as in Fig. 1d then gets the role of semiotic agent, which in effect
uses the semiotic triad. The three entities that occupy the corners of Fig. 2b are far from
simple. The A loop is an unusual stochastic feedback process, and fest and ftrue are
complex processes (with reproductive rates as outcome) that keep changing because of
the feedback and because of changes in the environment and organism.
As argued elsewhere (van Hateren 2014b), the relationship between fest and ftrue can
also be seen as a primordial form of intentionality (‘aboutness’, the property of standing
for or referring to something else; fest is about ftrue). In a sense, the form of fest represents
all the organism knows about its situation (as objectively represented by the form of
ftrue), which is similar to the concept of knowledge as discussed in Kull (2009). Both fest
and ftrue are complex processes with many inputs and at least some of their components
are likely to be related. This is likely, because only with related components fest can
approximate the value of ftrue across a wide range of circumstances. An example of a
related component is glucose surrounding a bacterium. Its presence may partially
determine ftrue, and the sensing of glucose by the bacterium may partially determine
fest. Such related components are part of another semiotic triad by themselves, with as
interpretant the fractional role glucose plays in the A loop. This more detailed level of
semiosis may in fact be more readily amenable to Peircian analysis than the rather
abstract general level of fest and ftrue.
One difference between the triad of Fig. 2b and semiotic triads as used for linguistic
analysis is that the current triad is not in the middle of a web of interrelated meanings.
Rather, it is a source of such a web (in addition to being interconnected with the triads
of other organisms). Neither ftrue nor the A loop can be expanded into further triads. But
fest can be expanded because it consists of a myriad of sub-goals that together contribute
to the overall goal of high fest. Such sub-goals form the bulk of specific meanings as
studied in biosemiotics, for example when assigning meaning to certain molecular
processes serving an organism (Barbieri 2008). The reason for differentiating the triad
of Fig. 2b from linguistic triads is that it presumably lies at the root of all meaning and
agency (van Hateren 2014b, 2015). There are no meanings below this level, and thus,








Fig. 2 Semiosis. a Standard Peircian triad, where a sign (sign vehicle) is connected to its (semiotic) object
through an interpretant, which interprets the sign and produces the meaning of the triad. b Tentative
interpretation of the theory of Fig. 1d as a (primordial) semiotic triad, where the A loop interprets fest as an
estimate of ftrue, resulting in enhanced fitness and the emergence of agency and meaning
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Concordances and Discordances with Eight Theses of Biosemiotics
In Kull et al. (2011), the conceptual basis and basic principles of the field of
biosemiotics are summarized in the form of eight theses. It is therefore interesting to
see to what extent the approach presented here is consistent with these principles, as
discussed below (theses I-VIII are all cited from Kull et al. 2011).
BI. The semiosic/non-semiosic distinction is co-extensive with life/non-life distinc-
tion, i.e., with the domain of general biology .^ This is consistent with the argument in
van Hateren (2013), where the A loop (steering either hereditary or behavioural change)
is viewed as producing the agency and meaning of life.
BII. Biology is incomplete as a science in the absence of explicit semiotic
grounding^. In van Hateren (2014a) I argue that the hereditary version of my theory
produces an inherent teleology within organisms, with fest and the A loop generating
goals and, at the behavioural level, agency (van Hateren 2014b).
BIII. The predictive power of biology is embedded in the functional aspect and
cannot be based on chemistry alone^. When all organisms have agency and intrinsic
meaning, prediction must utilize their implicit goal-directedness as one of the three
primary factors (along with environment and heredity/physiology). Sometimes the
latter two factors (e.g., a harsh winter or genetic disease) may determine biological
outcomes without also being caused by the organism's agency and goals. But usually,
biological outcomes also depend on (are partly caused by) agency and goals, for
example, when an animal deliberately migrates to a new territory. Although the value
of fest is ultimately produced by a physiological process, that process can only be
interpreted if it is recognized as a key component of the stochastic mechanism from
which agency, goals, and meanings emerge. Thus the intention to migrate is a real
phenomenon that must be included in a complete explanation of why the animal
migrates, including predictions of such behaviour.
BIV. Differences in methodology distinguish a semiotic biology from the non-
semiotic one^. The current approach does not specifically address methodology, but
it is at least compatible with this thesis. Meaning is often implicitly used for analysing
living systems in terms of using and processing information. Examples are cases where
genetic information is interpreted (for a review of biosemiotic interpretation see El-
Hani et al. 2006) and where sensory and neural processing is viewed as a form of
information processing. The specificity of the current theory may help to distinguish
information that is functioning as meaningful to the organism itself from information
that is merely used as an analysis tool by the investigator (and therefore may be only
meaningful to the investigator rather than to the organism).
BV. Function is intrinsically related to organization, signification, and the concept of
an autonomous agent or self^. This thesis is closely related to the thesis of autopoietic
theory (e.g., Thompson 2007) that autonomy and self-maintenance as such represent
meaning. I am critical of this viewpoint (see also extended discussions in van Hateren
2013, 2014b), because self-maintenance may be purely deterministic (or have
stochasticity without an A loop) and thus may produce no agency. Self-organization
is sometimes seen as the source of autonomy, but self-organization is quite common in
nature, occurring whenever systems have unstable and self-reinforcing dynamics (e.g.,
spontaneously generated tornadoes). Furthermore, maintaining the self as an autono-
mous unit can only be regarded as normative (implying goals and meaning) when the
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additional (tacit) assumption is made that existing is better than not existing (van
Hateren 2014b). Such an assumption is unwarranted, unless there is already an A loop.
I also do not agree with the thesis BEvolution presupposes function, rather than vice
versa^ (Kull et al. 2011, p. 32) if the term ‘function’ is regarded as normative. The basic
Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection could, in principle, work without the
extension with an A loop. It would lead to self-reproducing systems without agency and
meaning, and could not produce systems with consciousness. However, this is a
hypothetical case, because the extension provides an evolutionary advantage and
presumably evolved very early on (see van Hateren 2013 for a discussion).
Moreover, it is conceivable (but nearly impossible to prove) that without an enhanced
fitness-driven selection (fest amplifies ftrue) the overall drive would be too weak, in
practice, to let proto-life get off the ground or to prevent it from becoming extinct at an
early stage.
BVI. The grounding of general semiotics has to use biosemiotic tools^. This thesis is
consistent with the approach in van Hateren (2014b), which views more complex forms
of meaning, such as associated with human consciousness and language, as emerging
from more basic forms of meaning that are also present in non-human species. The
word ‘grounding’ acknowledges the possibility of emergence and the subsequent
necessity to use novel concepts (e.g., in the social sciences and humanities). This
would be similar to the present approach, which uses tools from the natural sciences
to ground biosemiotics, leading to novel concepts like agency and meaning.
BVII. Semiosis is a central concept for biology – however, it requires a more exact
definition^. The A loop and its elaborations can be seen as a defining, prototypical
model, as a valid proxy for a verbal definition. It incorporates several of the seven
specific criteria mentioned by Kull et al. (2011, pp. 36–38), in particular agency,
normativity, teleo-functionality (e.g., van Hateren 2014a), form generation (stochastic,
meaningful changes can explore novel forms as retained in hereditary and behavioural
memory), and inheritance of relations (e.g., van Hateren 2014b). Categorization is not
specifically included, but is consistent with the theory as a property that can evolve,
e.g., as a way to stabilize long-term memory. It can thereby support meaning, including
its extension to high-level symbolic systems (van Hateren 2014b). I believe there is
discordance with the final criterion, namely that a sign vehicle must be insulated from
the dynamics that it constrains. This is similar to the notion that the controlling system
must be separated from the controlled system (Pattee 2008). However, this requirement
of a strict separation of initial conditions (doing the controlling) and laws (subsequently
determining the fate of the controlled system) implicitly assumes systems described in a
deterministic manner. When the actual physical system is not deterministic, but partly
stochastic in the specific way of the A loop, it is no problem to have controller and
controlled being part of the same dynamics. A key point here is that agency and
meaning are not instantaneous, but only gradually build up statistical significance (see
van Hateren 2014b, 2015). The entanglement this implies makes it impossible to
separate controller and controlled.
BVIII. Organisms create their umwelten^. The Umwelt is a concept that comes from
von Uexküll (1982), who suggested that organisms perceive and interpret the world
into which they are embedded by generating internal meanings. The concept of Umwelt
is closely associated with the form of fest, the means through which an organism
attaches meaning to everything it implicitly takes to be relevant for its ftrue. The
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organism actively interacts with its world, modifying it and being modified by it. The
double-headed arrow s in Fig. 1d, which indicates a feedback loop through the
environment, is similar to von Uexküll's functional cycle. The result is that the
organism lives in a semiotic niche (Hoffmeyer 2008b) that depends on the organism's
own interpretations and coexists with the ecological niche. However, the semiotic niche
is still strongly connected to the ecological niche, because fest is tied to ftrue. Therefore,
the word ‘create’ in thesis VIII should not be interpreted as ‘freely construct’, that is,
the construction of an Umwelt is neither completely free nor completely determined.
The conclusion from the above discussion is that there is clearly a considerable
overlap between the theory presented in this article and standard biosemiotic notions.
Apart from a minor discordance with part of thesis VII, there is a stronger discordance
with thesis V with respect to the origin of agency and meaning. The current theory
partially agrees with thesis V to the extent that it also requires that organisms have
enough autonomy such that fitness (i.e., ftrue) takes a form that enables evolution. But
such autonomy is only necessary, not sufficient for normative functions. Normativity
and intrinsic goal-directedness are proposed here to emerge from fest and the stochastic
mechanism of the A loop, which produces agency as well. Agency as understood here
is in fact largely consistent with its typical use in biosemiotics (Tønnesen 2015), where
the Bcore attributes of an agent include goal-directedness, self-governed activity,
processing of semiosis and choice of action^ (see also van Hateren 2014b). For most
species, the expression Bchoice of action^ is probably a bit too strong, because
choosing seems to presuppose sharp categorization. I rather prefer to call it Bsome
behavioural freedom^ (van Hateren 2015), where behaviour is interpreted broadly to
include also processes within plants and unicellular organisms. But apart from wording,
it points to a similar concept.
On Explanation, Reduction, and the Various Forms of Causation
Some readers may worry that the theory as presented in Fig. 1d is inherently reduc-
tionistic, i.e., that it tries to reduce meaning and agency to purely physical processes. I
will argue that such an interpretation is wrong, and that this theory in fact explains the
phenomenon of emergence – that is, the emergence of meaning and agency. Although
emergent phenomena arise from simpler ones, they subsequently displace the simpler
phenomena as components that produce and explain higher levels. For explanations,
such displacement is not facultative, but inescapable, as will be argued below.
Explanation often involves showing how simple phenomena give rise to more
complex ones. When this works perfectly, one might say that a more complex
phenomenon is reduced to and fully defined by the simpler ones, including their
configuration. For example, the fact that a chair does not break down when one sits
on it is fully explained by the strengths of the seat and legs, and by how they are
connected. It is highly plausible that complex phenomena are always produced by
dynamical configurations of simpler phenomena. A simple argument for this is the
following. It is quite certain by now that not long after the beginning of the universe the
temperature was so high that there were only elementary particles, not even atoms yet.
That means that all more complex phenomena we can observe today – atoms, stars,
planets, life, meaning, and consciousness – must have coalesced, through time, from
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simpler precursors. Reduction can be regarded as an attempt to reconstruct these
simpler precursors and their subsequent coalescence, preferably not by simulating the
entire process through time but by using symbolic simplifications and short-cuts.
However, there are two major problems for such reconstructions. Both come from
the way human thinking works: explanation for humans requires symbolic representa-
tion (Deacon 1997). Systems of symbolic representation, in particular mathematical
systems, can be highly effective for describing fairly simple or restricted parts of nature.
But they quickly become intractable when systems become too complex. This is the
first major problem for reduction. For example, Laughlin and Pines (2000) argue that
fully explaining proteins in terms of quantum physics is infeasible in practice, and will
most likely remain so in the future. The new, empirically observed properties of such
molecules must therefore be taken as a starting point for a new discipline, organic
chemistry. Organic chemistry is then not reducible to quantum physics, and it is, as a
science, not less basic (Anderson 1972; Laughlin and Pines 2000).
The second major problem for reduction is even more fundamental. Mathematical
systems can only accurately represent the dynamics of deterministic systems.
Stochastic phenomena can only be described in a roundabout, probabilistic sense, by
using indirect constructs such as probability distributions (van Kampen 2007). It
therefore may seem rather problematic that reality appears to be, deep down, strongly
stochastic, as shown by modern physics. Fortunately, the stochasticity in nature often
averages out and fades away to such an extent that mathematical description and
prediction are quite feasible (e.g., for the motion of the planets in the solar system)
or at least somewhat feasible (e.g., for the weather).
In contrast, the A loop of Fig. 1d has properties that seem to make mathematical
description and prediction as infeasible as possible.7 Stochasticity gets a crucial role, in
a way that makes it impossible to let it average out or fade away. Stochasticity as driven
by fest is a prime factor in the causation, with lasting effects on future stochasticity. The
fest and stochasticity at a particular point in time depend on the entire history of fest and
all previous stochastic outcomes, because the A loop entangles these factors and the
result is stored in effectively permanent structural changes (memory). Hereditary and
physiological properties are retained over evolutionary time in the form of DNA and
the cellular system of organelles, which are indeed partly traceable to initial storage
billions of years ago. Similarly, development and learning establish memory that is
often permanent within the lifetime of individual organisms. Unfading memory means
that the A loop follows ever-changing, newly created trajectories through newly created
parts of hereditary and behavioural space. Consequently, it produces non-ergodic
dynamics, with future spaces undefinable in the present.
A further factor making complete mathematical description impossible is the com-
plexity of the feedback loop and the factors involved. In particular, fest is presumably
produced by physiology that – directly or indirectly – involves much, if not all of the
organism, because the functioning of the entire organism is the prime factor for its
7 In addition, the theory (in particular the mechanism of the A loop in Fig. 1d) is of a form that makes intuitive
comprehension difficult, because it combines two concepts – stochasticity and feedback – that imply highly
counter-intuitive forms of causation. Whereas stochasticity has the perplexing property of producing uncaused
change, feedback has the perplexing property of confounding cause and effect (when A causes B and B causes
A, which is then cause and which effect?). Moreover, the mechanism is driven by Darwin's theory (as
represented by the R loop in Fig. 1d), which is in itself hard to comprehend intuitively.
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fitness. Worse yet, fest cannot be understood in isolation, but only as an approximation
of ftrue and by how that affects the A loop. A model of the A loop therefore also requires
a model of ftrue. Although ftrue is an objective variable and process (implicitly produced
by nature happening), a scientist trying to model it would need detailed knowledge of
how a complex organism functions within a complex environment that includes a
complex biosphere. Exact knowledge of ftrue is clearly not possible in realistic situa-
tions. Moreover, ftrue is not independent of the fest (and its implied agency) of the
organisms present in the environment, which leads to complex causal loops at an
ecological level.
From the above discussion we have to conclude that the functioning of the A loop
cannot be reduced, not even in principle, to its components and how they are config-
ured. Similarly, its properties cannot be derived in any detail. Nature does produce
them, but there is no way to model that process completely. Highly simplified versions
of the loop (such as used for the simulations in van Hateren 2015) can provide some
insight into what is happening, but realistic versions will remain beyond reach. It is
plausible that the loop produces the new phenomena of agency and meaning, because
of the loop's structure and the way by which it lets fest drive stochasticity. However,
these phenomena have to be seen as novel, as emerging de novo. As usual in science
(Anderson 1972), such phenomena can subsequently be used as the starting point for a
higher-level discipline or disciplines. Nevertheless, for living organisms the physical
and meaningful will need to be integrated. Whereas the left half of Fig. 1d is mostly
physical, it is influenced by the fest of the organisms in the environment. The right half
of Fig. 1d is the origin of agency and meaning, but it is at the same time physical
because it depends on the organism's physiology.
The current analysis started from physical causation in the form of deterministic and
stochastic causation. The combined form of modulated stochastic causation still be-
longs to the physical world. However, the causation produced by the A loop, called
active causation, already belongs exclusively to life. It is an elementary form of agency,
closely related to what is elsewhere called ‘semiotic causation’ (Hulswit 2002;
Hoffmeyer 2008a), i.e., the bringing about of effects through interpretation. The new
form of causation has emerged from the highly specific combination of purely physical
causation as occurring in the A loop. But having emerged, it can no longer be described
purely in physical terms. It depends on goal-directedness, meaning, and agency, which
are phenomena that are not present in the physical world of non-living matter. As a
result, changes in the world of life can only be understood from three rather than two
basic forms of causation: deterministic, stochastic, and active/semiotic. The latter form
can subsequently evolve into increasingly complex forms of agency (van Hateren
2014b), including variants that might be described by a term like mental causation
(or intentional causation, as in Searle 2013).
Conclusion
Meaning and agency can be generated by an extension of the basic Darwinian theory of
evolution. This extension consists of a feedback loop in which a self-estimated version
of the organism's fitness, fest, modulates stochasticity as driving behavioural change,
with fest under selection pressure to conform to the organism's true fitness, ftrue. The
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theory resembles the Peircian semiotic triad, with fest in the role of sign, ftrue as its
object, and the feedback loop as interpretant. Moreover, the theory is mostly consistent
with standard notions as developed in biosemiotics. The theory results in two novel
properties, agency and goal-directedness (implying meaning) that emerge from the
dynamics of the proposed mechanism. These properties are novel primitives, irreduc-
ible to a purely physical description.
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